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¿Cómo se ve a Gaddafi fuera de Occidente?

¿Cómo se ve a Gaddafi fuera de Occidente?

Me parece que en Occidente se ve a Gaddafi solo como un dictador lunático. Sin embargo, después de una ingenua investigación sobre su vida, me he dado cuenta de lo compleja que era. Conocemos la mayor parte de su historial negativo, así que aquí quiero recordar que Libia era uno de los países más "desarrollados" de África, que apoyó a Nelson Mandela en un momento en que él y su organización eran considerados "terroristas" y promovió la Unión Africana.

Recuerdo claramente que los estados africanos fueron de los últimos en reconocer a las nuevas autoridades libias.

Así que me pregunto si su visión en Occidente es justa y, especialmente, cómo se le ve fuera de Occidente, por ejemplo. en Rusia, Irán y especialmente en África.


Creo que en Rusia teníamos poco conocimiento sobre Libia y Gaddafi antes de esta guerra.

Algunas personas recuerdan que fue un aliado soviético en la década de 1970 y también que fue acusado de apoyar el terrorismo.

Nuestra impresión de él como un dictador se deriva principalmente de su uniforme pomposo, que es estereotipado para los dictadores (es decir, un tipo con un uniforme de punto dorado -> es, probablemente, un dictador).

Durante la guerra, Gaddafi fue muy apoyado por los izquierdistas, antiamericanistas y nacionalistas patriotas, todos ellos constituyendo la mayoría. Fue vilipendiado por fuerzas pro estadounidenses (liberales). Esto es similar a lo que sucedió durante el bombardeo de Yugoslavia y la invasión de Irak.

El gobierno no apoyó a Gaddafi, especialmente debido al entonces presidente pro Wertern, Medvedev. Para justificar su posición, el gobierno citó las siguientes razones:

  • Gadafi en los últimos años ha tenido mejores relaciones con Occidente que con Rusia, no es un aliado nuestro.

  • Gaddafi no fue preciso al pagar la deuda.

  • Gaddafi financió la revolución naranja pro Estados Unidos en Ucrania para asegurar mejores relaciones con Occidente.

  • El ataque a Libia es principalmente un ataque a los intereses chinos más que a los rusos.

  • De todos modos, Estados Unidos bombardeará Libia hasta convertirlo en ruinas y lo derrocará, porque así lo decidieron, por lo que nuestra tarea más importante es asegurar mejores relaciones con el nuevo gobierno.

La posición del gobierno fue extremadamente impopular entre la gente porque muchos la vieron como una flagrante violación del derecho internacional y como un próximo paso hacia el ataque planeado contra Rusia, que ya está en la cola después de Siria, Irán y Bielorrusia. Algunas personas compararon la guerra con la guerra civil de 1936 en España, donde la URSS no protegió al gobierno antifascista.

Muchos vieron que el objetivo de la invasión de Wastern era apoyar a Al Quaeda, que supuestamente ahora cayó bajo el control estadounidense después de la muerte de Bin Laden, de manera similar a cómo Estados Unidos apoyó a los yihadistas en Afganistán. Creen que Estados Unidos quiere construir un poderoso chaliphate Sunny Wahhabi para aumentar la presión terrorista islamista sobre Rusia y China (esto está respaldado por los hechos de la ayuda occidental bastante abierta a los rebeldes terroristas islamistas en Chechenia).

Otra razón citada fue que Occidente quería tomar los recursos petroleros de Lybla, de manera similar a cómo Occidente intentó en Rusia en la década de 1990 (es decir, el asunto de Yukos y cosas por el estilo).

Durante la guerra mucha gente aprendió más sobre Libia, especialmente que era el país más desarrollado de África, que su nivel de vida era más alto que en todos los demás países árabes (incluida Arabia Saudita) y en Rusia.

En Internet había muchos recursos en ruso a favor de Gadafi, incluidos, por ejemplo, foros de médicos ucranianos que trabajaban en Libia (en realidad, un gran número porque Libia pagaba mucho más dinero a los médicos ucranianos y rusos que los propios Ucrania o Rusia, por lo que trabajar en Libia se convirtió en una práctica masiva para los médicos de Ucrania y Rusia). Se sabe que Libia tenía un sistema de atención médica de alta calidad y gratuito para todos, por lo que allí trabajaban médicos de muchos países (no solo de Rusia y Ucrania, sino también de Bulgaria, India y otros).

La opinión pública en Rusia actualmente es fuertemente pro-Gaddafi, que es una de las razones por las que Rusia tomó una posición diferente en Siria.


Gaddafi gastó millones de petróleo de Libia en su propia imagen, importancia personal, familia y ejército mientras su población era reprimida, encarcelada, torturada y dejada morir de hambre.

No creo que la visión de Occidente de Gaddafi esté distorsionada en absoluto.

Si era correcto que Occidente interfiriera en un país que no era de su incumbencia es un tema y una cuestión diferente.


Por qué Moammar Gadhafi era tan extraño

A raíz de la muerte de Moammar Gadhafi, los obituarios se han apresurado a mencionar las extrañas formas del dictador libio. Viajó con un séquito de atractivas guardaespaldas de mujeres, vestidas con uniformes militares y maquilladas. Llevaba atuendos coloridos y llamativos. Prefería recibir visitantes en una tienda beduina completa, incluso erigió una en Bedford, Nueva York, en 2009 en una propiedad alquilada a Donald Trump.

Muchos dictadores se han entregado a comportamientos extraños, pero las peculiaridades de Gadhafi eran únicas, según Jerrold Post, psicólogo político de la Universidad George Washington. Una cosa que tenía en común con otros dictadores, dijo Post a WordsSideKick.com, era una personalidad narcisista.

"Su lenguaje era extremadamente narcisista, 'Mi gente, todos me aman, todos aman me, ellos me protegerán ", dijo Post." Le parecía inconcebible que no todos lo amaran ".

Dictadores extraños

Muchos dictadores son conocidos por su comportamiento extraño. Mao Zedong, el líder comunista chino, supuestamente se negó a cepillarse los dientes, según "La vida privada del presidente Mao" (Random House, 1996), una memoria de Li Zhisui, el médico de Mao. El desinterés de Mao por la higiene dental puede haber sido el presagio de sus raíces campesinas.

En otras noticias dictador-odontológicas, el difunto "presidente vitalicio" de Turkmenistán, Saparmurat Atayevich Niyazov, quien gobernó hasta su muerte en 2006, sugirió que sus súbditos masticaran huesos para fortalecer sus dientes, aprendiendo de los perros. Niyazov también decidió cambiar el nombre meses después de los miembros de su propia familia.

Las excentricidades de algunos líderes parecen diseñadas para cimentar su poder. Francois "Papa Doc" Duvalier, quien gobernó Haití desde 1957 hasta 1971, una vez ordenó que se matara a todos los perros negros en Haití después de que le dijeron que un rival político se había transformado en uno. Duvalier construyó un culto a la personalidad a su alrededor, reviviendo las tradiciones vudú y declarándose el elegido de Dios.

Pero la extravagancia no es de ninguna manera un rasgo universal entre los dictadores, advirtió Post. Saddam Hussein, por ejemplo, no era conocido por su rareza, ni tampoco Joseph Stalin. [Comprender los 10 comportamientos humanos más destructivos]

Más allá de lo peculiar

Lo que muchos dictadores tienen en común, dijo Post, es un rasgo llamado "narcisismo maligno". Los narcisistas malignos son extremadamente ensimismados y se ven a sí mismos como los salvadores de su gente. Tienen una actitud paranoica, culpando a las fuerzas externas cuando las cosas van mal. Gadafi, por ejemplo, culpó tanto a Occidente como a Al Qaeda por el levantamiento libio, incluso afirmando que alguien había deslizado alucinógenos en el Nescafé de los rebeldes.

Los narcisistas malignos también carecen de conciencia y están dispuestos a usar cualquier agresión que sea necesaria para salirse con la suya, dijo Post. Y debido a que tienen el control total, hay pocos controles sociales sobre sus personalidades.

"Como dictadores, a diferencia de los líderes democráticos, pueden moldear su país para que se ajuste a su propia psicología", dijo Post.

Gadafi, sin embargo, puede haber ido más allá del narcisismo maligno típico, dijo Post. Parte del comportamiento de Gadhafi era una reminiscencia del trastorno límite de la personalidad, dijo, un trastorno marcado por un estado de ánimo y un comportamiento inestables.

"Podía drogarse mucho cuando estaba teniendo éxito y actuar como si se sintiera totalmente invulnerable", dijo Post. Cuando las cosas no iban bien, Gadafi podía ser tan inestable como cuando insistió durante el levantamiento libio en que su pueblo lo amaba.

Comportamientos extraños

Algunos de los comportamientos aparentemente extraños de Gadhafi tienen más sentido cuando se ven a la luz de la personalidad límite y el narcisismo maligno. En la década de 1970, por ejemplo, Gadhafi financió y apoyó el movimiento religioso estadounidense The Children of God, que sostenía entre sus creencias más controvertidas que el sexo era una herramienta aceptable de reclutamiento y conversión.

El líder de Los hijos de Dios, David Brandt Berg, posiblemente era él mismo un narcisista maligno, dijo Stephen Kent, un sociólogo de la Universidad de Alberta que estudió al grupo.

"Especialmente en los primeros días, Berg era virulentamente anti-estadounidense, y esa virulencia anti-estadounidense encajaba muy bien con Gadhafi", dijo Kent a WordsSideKick.com. "Cada uno pensaba que el otro se legitimaba".

Gracias a las tendencias de amor libre de Los Hijos de Dios & mdash llamaron al proselitismo con el sexo "pesca coqueta" & mdash, al menos un niño nació de la unión entre una mujer del grupo y un funcionario de alto rango en el régimen de Gadhafi, dijo Kent.

Debajo de la grandiosidad

Sin embargo, detrás de los delirios de grandeza de un narcisista maligno hay una sensación de profunda inseguridad y baja autoestima, dijo Post.

A veces, esta inseguridad tiene consecuencias trágicas. El dictador ugandés Idi Amin estaba inseguro por su falta de educación, dijo Post, y sacó esa sensación de inseguridad en purgas mortales contra los intelectuales en su país.

En cuanto a Gadhafi, su sentido del narcisismo probablemente se quedó con él hasta el final, dijo Post.

"No era tan psicótico como para negar lo que estaba pasando o que había perdido su poder", dijo. "Habiendo dicho eso, creo que le resultó difícil creer que era su propia gente la que se levantaba contra él".

Puedes seguir LiveScience la escritora senior Stephanie Pappas en Twitter @sipappas. Siga LiveScience para conocer las últimas noticias y descubrimientos científicos en Twitter @ciencia y en Facebook.


Héroe de la resistencia

Existe una sospecha más profunda derivada de experiencias pasadas, especialmente porque los cuatro países que lideran la campaña militar (Estados Unidos, Gran Bretaña, Francia e Italia) son los que más han estado involucrados en Libia antes.

Italia tiene el récord más oscuro.

Invadió Trípoli en 1911, con la esperanza de que los libios vieran esto como una liberación del dominio otomano. En cambio, provocó 20 años de rebelión.

Entonces como ahora, la región alrededor de Bengasi era el principal dominio rebelde, bajo el liderazgo de Omar al-Mukhtar.

El dictador fascista de Italia y # x27 Benito Mussolini finalmente aplastó el levantamiento con tácticas de castigo masivo.

Más de 100.000 libios fueron deportados de bastiones rebeldes a campos de concentración. Miles murieron.

En 1931, los italianos capturaron al propio Omar Mukhtar y lo ahorcaron frente a sus seguidores, convirtiéndolo en un mártir y héroe.

Mientras luchan contra el coronel Gaddafi, los rebeldes de Bengasi de hoy en día invocan su nombre.

Pero Gaddafi también ha tratado de utilizar el encanto de Mukhtar & # x27 para sus propios fines, para disgusto de muchos libios, incluso con una fotografía del líder rebelde en su ropa durante las reuniones de hace dos años con el primer ministro italiano Silvio Berlusconi para firmar una balsa. de acuerdos comerciales.

Pero mientras que los libios recuerdan lo que los italianos le hicieron a su país, muchos menos italianos lo recuerdan.


Políticas asombrosas y controvertidas

La carrera política de Gaddafi # 8217 abarcó casi cinco décadas, innumerables escándalos internacionales, una ideología social y política autónoma, un mito, una leyenda y un culto a los héroes. Se podrían escribir volúmenes sobre la política de Gaddafi. Para un comienzo más completo en la comprensión, sugiero visitar la página de Wikipedia sobre él.

La filosofía política de Gaddafi se llamó la & # 8220 Tercera Teoría Universal & # 8221 y se describió en detalle en su Libro Verde, donde todo, desde la música hasta la lactancia materna, la educación, la religión, los roles de género y la teoría socioeconómica, se detallaban en detalle. Como dice el propio libro:

El Libro Verde presenta la solución definitiva al problema del instrumento de gobierno e indica a las masas el camino por el que pueden avanzar de la era de la dictadura a la de la democracia genuina. 7

Gaddafi estaba bastante cautivado con el principio de democracia. Para él, la democracia representativa y multipartidista no era verdaderamente democrática ni era una dictadura, aunque en general se le consideraba un dictador. Y tal vez lo fue, pero a pesar de todo, solo tres años después de que Gadafi orquestara una golpe en Libia, renunció como primer ministro del gobierno libio, volviendo a titularse como líder hermano y guía de la Gran Revolución del Pueblo Socialista del Primero de Septiembre, Jamahiriya Árabe Libia, e instituyendo una compleja serie de Órganos ciudadanos autónomos con títulos como & # 8220Los Comités & # 8217s & # 8221 y el & # 8220 Congreso & # 8217s del Pueblo & # 8221 9.

Sin embargo, no funcionó tan bien como Gaddafi imaginó, y cerca del final de su vida, Gaddafi estaba, a veces sorprendentemente loco y otras, lúcido y consciente de sí mismo. Dijo en una ocasión:

Esperábamos que Libia, con su revolución, se convirtiera en un modelo de libertad, democracia popular y un estado libre de opresión e injusticia. Sin embargo, Libia se convirtió en otro estado convencional, incluso dictatorial o policial. Esto es profundamente lamentable. No somos así, ni queremos ser así. 10

En esencia, Gaddafi era socialista y su Libro Verde exponía las virtudes de una sociedad de y para el pueblo. Fue una reacción islámica a los excesos y desigualdades del capitalismo y el ateísmo que Gadafi veía como inherente al comunismo. 11

Las cuentas difieren, y fuentes occidentales dicen que la calidad de vida de los libios ha estado en declive durante unos 15-20 años. 12 Aún así, algunas estadísticas son difíciles de ignorar.

Por ejemplo, Libia bajo Gaddafi se convirtió en el país más alfabetizado, con más longevidad, más educado y de ingresos medios más altos de África 13 con beneficios de bienestar social que harían que el más liberal de los europeos se pusiera verde de envidia. ((Un gran héroe nacionalista Muammar Gaddafi. Blitz semanal.))

Aún así, Gaddafi era intolerante, a menudo antagónico [¿crees que antagonismo es lo suficientemente duro considerando que encarceló a personas homosexuales?] Hacia Occidente, árabes, cristianos, judíos, homosexuales y gente blanca. 14 Y como gobernante de una nación durante 42 años, no hay forma de que un artículo como este pueda hacer justicia a sus puntos de vista sociopolíticos. Le recomiendo que profundice más si está interesado. Sigue siendo uno de los personajes más fascinantes de los siglos XX y XXI.


9 de los intentos de golpe más famosos jamás hechos en la historia

Un golpe ocurre cuando hay un derrocamiento repentino del gobierno, generalmente por parte de los militares del país. El motivo del acto es reemplazar al gobierno por otro cuerpo del propio ejército, o un civil elegido por la autoridad. No importa quién termine con el control del país, no se puede negar la pérdida de vidas y propiedades. Sin olvidar la alta probabilidad de una guerra civil que sigue inmediatamente después. Echa un vistazo a algunos de los intentos de golpe más famosos de todos los tiempos.

1. El Putsch del Salón de la Cerveza

El famoso intento de golpe que condujo a la autobiografía de Hitler MI lucha. En 1923, Adolf Hitler llevó a más de 2000 nazis a una cervecería donde exigirían un rescate al gobierno y finalmente tomarían el control del país. Los nazis fracasaron estrepitosamente. Subestimaron totalmente al gobierno y, finalmente, sus armas resultaron inadecuadas. La policía alemana terminó matando a 16 nazis. Se rumorea que el propio Hitler se escondía detrás de otros mientras intentaban encontrar una salida. Finalmente fue arrestado y encarcelado por esto, donde terminó escribiendo el libro.

2. Golpe de Malí

Uno de los peores golpes de la historia ocurrió en 2012 cuando los soldados malienses, disgustados con la gestión del presidente Amadou Toumani Touré de la rebelión tuareg (una serie de insurgencias que ocurrieron desde 1916 mientras los rebeldes luchaban por la independencia del norte de Malí), formaron el Comité Nacional para la Restauración de la Democracia. Los militares atacaron la capital de Barnako además de los cuarteles militares, las estaciones de noticias controladas por el gobierno y el palacio presidencial. El golpe resultó en la muerte de 15.000 soldados, desplazando a más de 100.000 civiles.

3. Revolución naranja

Ucrania atravesó una grave conmoción entre noviembre de 2004 y enero de 2005. Kiev fue el centro de la protesta que tuvo lugar después de que las elecciones presidenciales de Ucrania se vieran interrumpidas por el fraude, la corrupción y la intimidación de los votantes. El efecto dominó se sintió en todo el país con actos de desobediencia civil, huelgas generales y marchas. El presidente finalmente fue expulsado del poder, pero no antes de herir y matar a miles de manifestantes.

4. El régimen de los coroneles

1967 a 1974, conocido como el régimen de los coroneles, fue oscuro para los griegos. El país estuvo bajo un gobierno militar directo durante este tiempo, justo después de que un grupo de coroneles derrocara al gobierno. Curiosamente, el rey griego durante ese tiempo ni siquiera intentó detener el golpe. Las cosas se salieron de control para los militares cuando aumentaron las tensiones entre Grecia y Turquía. Esto se volvió demasiado inestable y el rey finalmente cayó del poder. El rey aparentemente todavía está vivo, pero sobrevive como cualquier otro plebeyo.

5. El golpe de Musharraf

Pakistán ha sido testigo de varios intentos de golpe en el pasado. Seis desde su independencia, para ser precisos, y el último tuvo lugar en 1999 cuando el entonces líder militar Parvez Musharraf derrocó al gobierno paquistaní. Fue un golpe incruento cuando Musharraf declaró una emergencia y tomó el control de todo el país. Como resultado, se violaron muchas leyes. La Corte Suprema de Pakistán intervino al ordenar que el gobierno militar solo podría durar otros 3 años antes de que regresara la democracia, pero Musharraf insistió en que debería durar más. ¡Él planteó un referéndum que ganó con un asombroso 98 por ciento! Los dictadores ganan referéndums en un 98%, lo que sugiere cuán corrupto podría haber sido el estado en ese entonces.

6. Napolean Bonaparte

En la década de 1700, Francia estaba bajo el gobierno de un directorio de cinco miembros. Algo por lo que Napoleón no estaba muy feliz. Entonces, cuando regresó de una campaña militar egipcia en octubre de 1799, comenzó a planificar una forma de derrocarlos. Él tampoco estaba solo. Dos de los cinco directores estaban con él, al igual que otros co-conspiradores de alto nivel. Para sobornar / intimidar a los hombres en el poder, Napolean organizó una sesión legislativa especial fuera de París el 10 de noviembre. La cámara baja, sin embargo, lo avergonzó con cánticos de "abajo con el dictador" y lo echó de la cámara. Sin embargo, logró salirse con la suya y derrocó el directorio, convenciendo a las tropas de que despejaran el área. Escogió a un grupo de legisladores para abolir el directorio y nombrarlo en su lugar para un consulado de tres miembros. En 1804, Napoleón se coronó emperador. Muchos creen que este golpe puso fin a la revolución francesa y comenzó el primer imperio francés.

7. Muammar Gaddafi

Muammar Gaddafi odiaba a la monarquía libia y a todos los occidentales que la apoyaban. Nacido de padres analfabetos en beduinos, su hostilidad siguió creciendo hasta que finalmente sintió que el poder de la monarquía se desvanecía. Después de esperar la oportunidad adecuada, Gaddafi, que ahora tenía 27 años y se desempeñaba como oficial subalterno del ejército, decidió tomar el poder él mismo el 1 de septiembre de 1969. Cuando el rey Idris estaba fuera del país de vacaciones en un centro de salud, él y Aproximadamente 70 cómplices en vehículos militares irrumpieron en las ciudades de Trípoli y Bengasi. Rodearon el palacio real y otros edificios gubernamentales, cortaron las comunicaciones y arrestaron a algunos funcionarios del gobierno. Uno de esos funcionarios incluso saltó a una piscina en pijama en un intento desesperado por escapar. Los guardias personales del rey fueron los únicos que resistieron, pero incluso ellos finalmente cedieron. Solo pasaron dos horas antes de que finalmente terminara el golpe incruento. La locura de Gaddafi comenzó muy pronto con sus caprichos y fantasías que afectaron a todos los libios. Su reinado duró 42 años antes de que Estados Unidos decidiera intervenir. Muammar Gaddafi fue asesinado en 2011.

8. Masacre de todos los santos, 1979

En el Día de Todos los Santos en 1979, Bolivia fue testigo de uno de sus peores días en la historia. Alberto Natusch Busch lideró una represión bastante violenta del régimen militar golpista el 1 de noviembre de ese año. Las protestas masivas encabezadas por la confederación sindical Central Obrera Boliviana se encontraron con una violenta acción militar. A los soldados de La Paz se les dio libertad para actuar sin órdenes. Alrededor de 200 personas murieron, 200 más resultaron heridas. Alrededor de 125 personas también "desaparecieron" misteriosamente.

9. Revolución cubana

Quizás los golpes de estado más famosos de todos los tiempos. Castro quería implementar sus políticas marxistas en todo el país, pero la verdadera revolución no comenzó antes del 26 de julio de 1953. Castro envió a un grupo de unos 160 rebeldes liderados por el héroe de la revolución, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, para atacar. el Cuartel Moncado en Santiago y el Cuartel en Bayamo. La Revolución Cubana provocó la salida del general Fulgencio Batista el 1 de julio de 1959. Como un cartel de los rebeldes, el rostro de Guevara terminó en camisetas y paredes de muchos partidarios de todo el mundo.


Cuatro años después de Gaddafi, Libia es un Estado fallido

Casi cuatro años después de que los rebeldes respaldados por la OTAN derrocaran al ex gobernante libio Muammar Gaddafi, el país del norte de África se ha sumido en un caótico malestar.

El fracaso de las elecciones del año pasado para lograr la unidad política en Libia fue más evidente cuando Fajr Libia, o & # 8220Libya Dawn & # 8221 - una coalición diversa de grupos armados que incluye una serie de milicias islamistas - rechazó el resultado de las elecciones y tomó el control de Trípoli. . El gobierno reconocido internacionalmente se trasladó a Tobruk, situado en el este de Libia a lo largo de la costa mediterránea cerca de la frontera con Egipto, mientras que Libya Dawn estableció un gobierno rival, conocido como el nuevo Congreso Nacional General, en la capital.

A medida que las fuerzas alineadas con el gobierno de Tobruk han luchado contra Libya Dawn, el conflicto se ha internacionalizado gradualmente. Egipto y los Emiratos Árabes Unidos han lanzado ataques aéreos contra Libya Dawn, mientras que se cree que Turquía, Qatar y Sudán han proporcionado a la coalición dominada por los islamistas diversos grados de apoyo.

El surgimiento de Daesh (el llamado & # 8220 Estado islámico & # 8221) en áreas estratégicamente vitales de Libia ha complicado aún más el conflicto en África, el país más rico en petróleo y ha planteado preocupaciones de seguridad en los estados cercanos.

El general más polarizador de Libia

El voluble general Khalifa Belqasim Haftar se ha convertido en un líder influyente, aunque muy divisivo, en este sangriento conflicto.

A principios de marzo, el general antiislamista fue nombrado comandante de las fuerzas armadas leales al gobierno de Tobruk. El papel de Haftar en el antiguo régimen de Gadafi, su acogedora relación con Washington y las sospechas sobre sus ambiciones a largo plazo le han dado una reputación controvertida entre muchos libios. No obstante, también se está ganando el respeto de quienes comparten su vitriolo por los islamistas.

Haftar fue uno de los primeros partidarios de Gadafi y desempeñó un papel importante como uno de los & # 8220 Oficiales Libres & # 8221 en la revolución de 1969 que derrocó a la monarquía dirigida por el rey Idris al-Sanusi. Gadafi dijo más tarde que Haftar & # 8220 era mi hijo ... y yo era como su padre espiritual & # 8221. Fue el comienzo de una carrera militar en la que Haftar luchó en muchos bandos diferentes.

Durante la guerra árabe-israelí de 1973, Haftar dirigió un batallón libio. Más tarde, como comandante de las fuerzas libias en el país y la guerra de 1980-1987 con Chad, fue presuntamente responsable de crímenes de guerra cuando sus fuerzas fueron acusadas de usar napalm y gas venenoso.

En 1987, el ejército chadiano obtuvo una gran victoria en la batalla de Wadi al-Doum. Además de matar a más de 1.000 efectivos libios, Chad tomó como prisioneros a más de 400 libios, incluido Haftar.

Alrededor de ese tiempo, las lealtades de Haftar cambiaron.

Mientras estuvo detenido en Chad, Haftar trabajó con otros oficiales libios para coordinar un golpe contra Gaddafi, antes de que Estados Unidos asegurara su liberación, llevándolo por aire a él y a 300 de sus hombres a Zaire (ahora República Democrática del Congo), y de allí a Virginia.

Como ciudadano estadounidense recién nombrado, Haftar vivió en el norte de Virginia de 1990 a 2011, y pasó parte de este tiempo trabajando con la CIA antes de regresar a Libia en marzo de 2011 para luchar una vez más contra el régimen de Gaddafi. Varias fuentes insisten en que Haftar estaba fuera de las manos de la CIA en 2011, pero otras sostienen que el gobierno de Estados Unidos orquestó su regreso a Libia ese año.

Libia y # 8217s Guerra civil

El año pasado, Haftar pidió la disolución unilateral del parlamento de Libia y el establecimiento de un & # 8220 comité presidencial & # 8221 para gobernar el país hasta que se celebren nuevas elecciones. Haftar citó la & # 8220 convulsión & # 8221 de Libia como justificación para que las fuerzas armadas se hicieran cargo.

Muchos vieron su acto como un intento de golpe militar destinado a aplastar a los Hermanos Musulmanes, que había ganado el segundo lugar en las elecciones de 2012 en Libia. El primer ministro Ali Zeidan desestimó su anuncio como & # 8220 ridículo & # 8221.

Aunque muchos en el gobierno de Libia lo veían como un general deshonesto hambriento de poder, su campaña en curso contra las fuerzas islamistas le ha ganado gradualmente seguidores. En mayo pasado, Haftar emprendió una campaña llamada & # 8220Operation Dignity & # 8221 para & # 8220eliminar los grupos terroristas extremistas & # 8221 en el país. Desde entonces, el gobierno con sede en Tobruk ha apoyado en general al general, considerándolo como la mejor apuesta del gobierno en la lucha contra sus enemigos islamistas.

La cruzada antiislámica de Haftar es paralela a la del presidente egipcio Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, que preside una represión contra los islamistas egipcios. Al no hacer distinciones entre los llamados islamistas moderados como la Hermandad Musulmana y facciones de línea dura como Daesh y Ansar al-Sharia (un afiliado de al-Qaeda), Haftar y Sisi están vendiendo una narrativa a Occidente de que sus posiciones anti-islamistas están sincronizados con la & # 8220 guerra global contra el terrorismo & # 8221.

Hasta ahora, Haftar no ha estado dispuesto a negociar con Libya Dawn, que contiene el ala política de la Hermandad Musulmana de Libia y el bloque & # 8220Loyalty to Martyrs & # 8221 dentro de su coalición. A su vez, Libya Dawn se niega a negociar con Haftar.

Las Naciones Unidas han comenzado a albergar conversaciones en Marruecos entre las diversas facciones políticas de Libia en un esfuerzo por unirlas contra la creciente amenaza de Daesh. Desafortunadamente, los esfuerzos de la ONU para empujar a los dos gobiernos de Libia hacia el diálogo se ven socavados por los bajos niveles de confianza entre ellos y su creencia mutua de que solo a través de la lucha armada continua pueden asegurar más territorio y recursos. De hecho, con un fuerte respaldo de El Cairo y Abu Dhabi, Haftar probablemente esté convencido de que puede obtener mayores logros mediante la guerra que con la diplomacia.

El legado tóxico del régimen autoritario y divisivo de Gaddafi, que enfrentó a las diversas facciones de Libia entre sí, ha plagado las perspectivas de que cualquier autoridad central obtenga una legitimidad generalizada en el país devastado por la guerra. De hecho, desde que fue derrocado en 2011, Libia se ha convertido en un caldero de anarquía, con poca seguridad significativa fuera de Trípoli y Bengasi.

El régimen de Gaddafi oprimió duramente a los grupos islamistas que formaron Libya Dawn, que considera que su ascenso al poder en Trípoli fue duramente reñido y que tardará mucho en llegar. Ven a Haftar como un criminal de guerra del antiguo régimen comprometidos con su eliminación, lo que sin duda socavará el potencial de los dos gobiernos de Libia para llegar a un acuerdo significativo de reparto del poder. Sin paz a la vista, lo más probable es que continúe el sangriento estancamiento entre los gobiernos de Tobruk y Trípoli.

Consecuencias internacionales de la agitación de Libia

La caída de Gaddafi provocó un tsunami geopolítico en África y Oriente Medio.

Libia es ahora el hogar de la mayor reserva de armas sueltas del mundo, y sus porosas fronteras son transitadas habitualmente por una serie de actores no estatales fuertemente armados, incluidos los separatistas tuareg y yihadistas que obligaron al ejército nacional de Malí a abandonar Tombuctú y Gao en marzo de 2012 con nuevos adquirió armas de Libia. La ONU también ha documentado el flujo de armas desde Libia hacia Egipto, Gaza, Níger, Somalia y Siria.

En octubre pasado, 800 combatientes leales a Daesh tomaron el control de Derna cerca de la frontera con Egipto, a unas 200 millas de la Unión Europea. Desde entonces, la rama libia de Daesh ha tomado el control de Sirte y ha ganado cierto grado de influencia en Bengasi, la segunda ciudad más grande del país y el corazón del levantamiento de 2011 contra Gaddafi.

El uso del territorio libio por parte del grupo para aterrorizar y amenazar a otros estados ha aumentado las apuestas internacionales. En febrero, Daesh decapitó a 21 trabajadores migrantes de Egipto porque eran cristianos coptos, luego lanzó un video de propaganda que contenía imágenes del acto atroz. Eso llevó a Egipto a lanzar ataques aéreos directos contra los objetivos del grupo en Derna.

En noviembre pasado, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, el grupo yihadista dominante en el Sinaí egipcio, juró lealtad a Daesh, al igual que Boko Haram de Nigeria más recientemente. Daesh también ha hecho amenazas directas contra Italia, lo que ha llevado a los funcionarios de Roma a advertir que el ejército italiano puede intervenir en Libia para contrarrestar a los combatientes de Daesh.

Una cuarta parte de los combatientes de Daesh en Derna provienen de otros países árabes y Afganistán. Una gran afluencia de combatientes de Jabhat al-Nusra de Siria también ha entrado en la refriega en Libia, subrayando cómo los extremistas islamistas de tierras lejanas han explotado el estatus de Libia como un estado fallido. Este hecho se puso de relieve más recientemente cuando un miembro sudanés de la división de Libia de Daesh llevó a cabo un ataque suicida el 5 de abril, que tuvo como objetivo un puesto de control de seguridad cerca de Misrata. El sangriento incidente resultó en cuatro muertos y más de 20 heridos.

El número de estados débiles o fallidos en África sugiere que tales redes internacionales continuarán aprovechándose de las frágiles autoridades centrales y la anarquía en todo el Sahel extremadamente subdesarrollado y otras áreas del continente para extender su influencia. En ausencia de una resolución política a su guerra civil, Libia en particular, como un estado fallido con enormes reservas de petróleo, seguirá siendo vulnerable a las fuerzas extremistas que esperan tomar el poder en medio del actual pantano.


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Reciba el correo electrónico del Morning Call del New Statesman.

Poco antes de morir en 1970, el presidente egipcio Gamal Abdel Nasser dijo: "Me gusta bastante Gaddafi. Me recuerda a mí mismo cuando tenía esa edad". Cuando era un adolescente que crecía en el desierto a las afueras de Sirte, Gaddafi había escuchado ávidamente las incendiarias transmisiones nacionalistas árabes de Nasser en Radio Cairo. Su escuela incluso lo había expulsado por organizar una huelga estudiantil en apoyo del líder egipcio. Aquí estaba el "líder de los árabes", que había humillado a las antiguas potencias coloniales durante Suez y trajo la promesa de unidad a la región, dando su bendición. Para el joven coronel, que todavía no tiene 30 años, no podría haber mayor cumplido.

Gaddafi seemed worthy of the older man's mantle when he came to power in Libya on 1 September 1969, deposing the weak, pro-western king Idris while the monarch was receiving medical treatment abroad. By the end of 1970, he had expelled between 15,000 and 25,000 of the despised Italians who had occupied Libya from 1911-41, removed the US and British military bases, and turned Tripoli's Catholic cathedral into the Gamal Abdel Nasser Mosque.

Forty years on, Gaddafi is the object of international vilification once again. Yet America's fury at the Lockerbie bomber's triumphant repatriation does not change the fact that the Libyan leader is now a friend of the west. He has held meetings with Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and Silvio Berlusconi greeted him with a warm embrace when his plane touched down at Ciam­pino Airport in Rome in June. The former "mad dog of the Middle East", as Ronald Reagan called him, is even due to address the UN General Assembly in New York on 23 September. He has stopped offering sanctuary to and sponsoring terrorists, and traded his WMD programme for the normalisation of relations with the west.

None of this would have been conceivable during Gaddafi's early years in power. By the late 1960s, oil revenues were rapidly increasing - Libya overtook Kuwait as the world's fifth-largest exporter in 1969 - and Gaddafi played an important role in the 1973-74 oil crisis in which Opec cut production and raised prices, by leading the embargo on shipments to the US. At the same time as making good on his promises to provide free education and health care (as well as subsidised housing) for Libya's small population, he could back his ambition for regional hegemony with money, providing subsidies to Egypt and to others he saw as allies in the fight against Israel.

But Gaddafi did not limit his aid to Israel's enemies. Over time, it seemed any group that styled itself as a freedom movement could call on the Libyan state purse, from the IRA to the Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines. Although his dreams of a pan-Arab merger with Tunisia, Egypt and Syria failed, Gaddafi's influence was felt far and wide. This frequently alarmed his neighbours, as did his erratic behaviour. In 1973, for instance, the QEII set sail from Southampton to Haifa full of Jewish passengers celebrating the 25th anniversary of the State of Israel. According to Nasser's successor Anwar al-Sadat, Gaddafi ordered an Egyptian submarine temporarily under his command to torpedo the liner: a directive countermanded only when Sadat ordered the sub to return to base in Alexandria.

Those who have met the "Brother Leader and Guide of the Revolution" over the decades describe him as "dramatic", "charismatic", "camp" (a television reporter who interviewed him in the 1970s told me he was convinced Gaddafi was wearing eyeliner) and always "unpredictable". He surrounds himself with female bodyguards, and broke wind noisily throughout an interview with the BBC's John Simpson. In March, he stormed out of an Arab summit in Qatar, declaring himself "the dean of the Arab rulers, the king of kings of Africa and the imam of all Muslims". Such behaviour can, but should not, obscure the reality that he presided over a police state that dealt brutally with anyone perceived to pose a threat. By 1975, Sadat was already describing him as "100 per cent sick and possessed by the devil".

But for all Gaddafi's rashness during this decade (he also launched abortive invasions of Chad in 1972 and 1980), initially at least the west gave the young colonel's new regime the green light. "We thought he was a bit left-wing," says a British source, "but not too bad, and that we could deal with him." The US even supplied him with intelligence support. Very soon after the coup that brought him to power, the CIA warned him of a plot within the Revolutionary Command Council, Libya's supreme authority, allowing him to arrest and imprison the ring­leaders. News travelled, and Gaddafi gained a reputation in the region for enjoying America's favour. Although this had mostly evaporated by the end of the decade, Billy Carter, brother of the US president Jimmy Carter, still attended celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of Gaddafi's accession on 1 September 1979. In one of the many embarrassments he caused his brother, it was later revealed that Billy had received a $220,000 loan from the Libyan government.

The change was decisive once Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office in 1981. That August, the US air force shot down two Libyan fighter planes in disputed waters in the Mediterranean. Reagan ordered US citizens to leave the country and refused US passport holders permission to travel there. By the end of the year, his administration was claiming that Libya had plans to assassinate the president and, if that failed, would target other senior officials such as the vice-president George H W Bush, the secretary of state Al Haig and the defence secretary Caspar Weinberger.

After four more years of skirmishes and ineffective sanctions, Reagan seized on a specific incident that he felt could justify a forceful strike on the Libyan regime: the bombing in April 1986 of a West Berlin disco packed with off-duty US servicemen. The US reprisal, in which Gaddafi's adopted daughter Hanna died, was controversial. There were suggestions - since given more credence - that Syria or Iran was behind the disco bombings. No European ally apart from Britain would give permission to the US to use its bases to launch the attack. Today, the Tory MP Daniel Kawczynski, chairman of the parliamentary all-party Libya group and author of a forthcoming biography of Gaddafi, says: "More questions should have been asked in parliament. We were rather gung-ho in supporting the attack."

As far as Britain was concerned, two incidents confirmed Gaddafi as the leader of a terrorist state: the fatal shooting of PC Yvonne Fletcher by a gunman inside the Libyan embassy in London in 1984, and the 1988 downing of the Pan Am jet at Lockerbie. These continue to be the main stumbling blocks to Gaddafi's final rehabilitation in the eyes of the west, as the international row over the repatriation from a Scottish prison of Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi has demonstrated. "The man who shot PC Yvonne Fletcher has been identified in Tripoli," says Kawczynski. "For us to let them have al-Megrahi without insisting on a statement about her is ludicrous." The Tory MP is also working with the Northern Irish Democratic Unionist Party to try to secure compensation for the victims of Libyan-funded IRA atrocities. He says he has repeatedly raised these issues with government ministers, but has been rebuffed. "'Don't rock the boat,' was what one of them said to me."

The story of how the "mad dog" came in from the cold goes back to the 1990s, when Kofi Annan and Nelson Mandela persuaded the Libyan leader that the two Lockerbie suspects should stand trial (al-Megrahi's co-defendant was acquitted). The UN immediately suspended sanctions it had imposed in 1992 and 1993. When Gaddafi was quick to condemn the attacks of 11 September 2001 as acts of terrorism, urging Libyans to donate blood for use by American victims, it seemed another remarkable volte-face by a man who would once have been expected to revel in US misfortune.

In fact, it was a sign that Gaddafi was never the irrational maverick some liked to say he was. Sanctions had hit the Libyan economy hard, depriving the country of the specialists and the markets it needed to exploit its oil wealth and two other factors had left him short of allies. As the diplomat and Middle East specialist Sir Mark Allen, who was one of the UK's negotiators in the talks that led to Britain's rapprochement with Libya, writes in his book, Arabs: "At the end of the cold war, the Arab left was stranded . . . The region was retuning . . . The reference points were not left or right, monarchical tradition or the promises of socialism, but fidelity to the example of the early Muslim community."

After Egypt and Israel made peace at Camp David, Gaddafi turned ever closer to the Soviet Union, which stationed thousands of military advisers inhis country and from which he bought billions of dollars of arms. But once the USSR collapsed, says Oliver Miles, a former British ambassador to Libya, "he saw that if Uncle Sam was going to give him a kick, there was no one there to protect him". Nor was it conceivable that he could embrace the Islamists who, in fact, posed a threat to his rule. "He was deeply concerned about the threat from al-Qaeda," says Mike O'Brien, who as a Foreign Office minister was the first member of a British government to meet Gaddafi in 2002. "He had always promoted a more secularist, nationalist agenda."

He had set out his views at great length during his first decade in power, in the three volumes of his Green Book. His "Third Universal Theory" supposedly combined Islam with socialism - though the loose structure he presided over, which allowed for relatively free discussion by his associates before the leader took the final decision and retired to his tent in the desert, could be viewed as owing just as much to Arab, tribal forms of decision-making. Yet however one views Gaddafi's philosophy, he has long set his face against the Islamists, and he acted against ex-mujahedin fighters returning from Afghan­istan in the mid-1990s when other Arab states welcomed them home. Indeed, Gaddafi was the first leader to call for an international arrest warrant for Osama Bin Laden in 1998.

Once Gaddafi took the step to open up and dismantle his WMD programme, and then agree compensation for victims of Lockerbie, the way was open for the inter­national community to welcome Libya back. Gaddafi's son and possible heir, Saif, is clear about the path Libya is now taking. "The future is with more liberalism, more freedom, with democracy," he said in an interview with Tiempo revista. "This is the evolution of the entire world, and you either go with it or be left behind."

O'Brien, for one, is convinced. "Gaddafi is an intelligent guy who has been in control for 40 years," he says. "He realised that the only way to extradite himself from his difficulties was to use Libya's oil and gas wealth. This was realpolitik. He recognises that the world has changed and that he has to change with it."

For those who believe the west made a disastrous mistake in opposing the wave of nationalist politicians who came to power in the Middle East from the 1950s onwards, there is an irony. Gaddafi is the last of that generation, and while others who cloaked themselves in the rhetoric of Nasser have fallen, failed or died, it is the young man once praised by the Egyptian president who now appears to be becoming the kind of Arab leader with whom we can, and with whom we wish, to do business.


Map of Libya

The list above shows that, if he actually kept to the provision of the list, Muammar Gaddafi tried to provide for the people of Libya as much as he could. It was democracy that the Libyan people wanted, but had to fight to the death to get it.

&aposDemocracy&apos is a weapon being used by the West gainst the Middle East to start protests and uprising by the people in those countries, because most of the Middle Eastern countries are still being ruled under the Islamic Sharia law.

To break the mould and for the West to infiltrate the Middle East, &aposdemocracy&apos is an easy weapon to use, or you could also call it &apospropaganda&apos. Although we are in the 21st century, Islam is a religion which is forever, but when people in the Middle East look at the way Western countries are ruled, the people of the Middle East want a democracy in their countries. Islam does not support a &aposdictatorship regime&apos, so the leaders of those countries should rule with democracy. There is no contradiction here, as the truth is that in the time of the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon Him), there was democracy and Islam was perfect, the law and ruling was perfect. It was run according to the Shari&aposa Law. Islam is and has been perfected by Allah, as it is written in the Quran, but it is human beings who make it difficult for themselves.


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I hour 53 minutes ago: Muammar Gaddafi is believed to be hiding near the western Libyan town of Ghadamis…. Hisham Buhagiar, a senior military official of Libya's new leadership, told Reuters, "One tribe, the Touareg, is still supporting him and he is believed to be in the Ghadamis area in the south.

Over the past weeks, the Tuareg (at times spelled Touareg) have appeared again and again as the most reliable allies of Gaddafi and his family, fighting against the Libyan revolution, giving their protection to him and his closest entourage as they hide deep in the Sahara, offering guides and escorts for those who have been making their way through remote corners of the desert to find sanctuary in Niger. The Tuareg know the desert as no one else can. This is what we gather from the recent news stories in which they have been appearing. A tribe of the Sahara, whose deep understanding of that fierce and mysterious landscape can offer a profound, ineffable secrecy and safety to Gaddafi himself. They are the indigenous people of a terrain in which no others could live, or even find their way – this is the quite reasonable implication of the recent news stories in which they have figured.

So we find ourselves thinking, or are invited to think: the magic of the tribal world seems to be available to the deposed tyrant. Those who follow the news but know very little of these mysterious tribesmen of the Sahara can find themselves wondering if the Tuareg are the simple, unquestioning beneficiaries of some kind of corrupt generosity, and thus deluded into saving the skins of the Gaddafis. Wondering, too, if we can forgive them for this because they are the children of the desert, the wild people of a wild place.

The images that these snippets of news from the immense and arid border between Libya, Algeria, Mali and Niger evoke, and the questions they prompt, grow from a familiar dichotomy: the simple, primitive, traditional (these all become words for the same thing) are duped, or bribed, into giving their support to the sophisticated, civilized, modern (and these are words for the opposite thing). We can see in our minds’ eyes the nomads of the desert, with their camels and skin tents, living in an ancient harmony with their arid, rather terrifying environment. And see, also, the Gaddafi gang: despots and plunderers who are now having to take their leave of the complex luxuries and brutal politics of privilege and power in an oil-rich nation state. The weather-beaten camel herders, used to a life close to the desert, living in the fascinating harmonies of indigenous peoples the Arab potentates escaping in their convoys of 4 by 4s, armed to the teeth, hauling their looted millions with them. A compelling contrast. The tribal and the civilized. A version of the nature:culture dyad, perhaps, underpinned, as it often is, with a moral opposition: a natural and aboriginal entity that we are quick to think of as inherently good alongside that which is inherently wicked.

For those who care about the tribal, who support and take inspiration from indigenous culture and ways of life, this conjunction of the Tuareg and Gaddafi is profoundly troubling. There are different sources of upset, various lines of upset questioning. Have the trusting Tuareg been tricked, bribed or blackmailed into providing their support? Or: is theirs such a naivety and lack of understanding of the wider world that Tuareg tribesmen and women just do not know when they are dealing with the devil? Or is there something about the tribal world that makes it susceptible to this kind of exploitation and possible corruption?

Questions on the margin

These are questions that come from a particular and prevalent idea of the tribal, and indeed of Gaddafi. The Tuareg may not be well known in Britain, and are little covered in the British media. In 1972, Granada TV broadcast a film in the Disappearing World series, made by Charlie Nairn with research and access provided by anthropologist Jeremy Keenan. As with all of the Disappearing World films, this went out at prime time, midweek, and was previewed and reviewed (though the academic reviews were typically belated: a short savaging of the film appeared in The America Anthropologist in March, 1974). Nairn’s film is centred on a group of Tuareg who were then living, with great difficulty, in the bleak landscape of the mountains of the Hoggar Range. And the film urged the view that this life had become impossible – so the Tuareg were indeed disappearing. An evocation of marginality, a clinging to life in hopeless defiance of the inevitable, is a tempting paradigm for any work about indigenous peoples. It plays to the drama of extremes of environment as well as extremes of human endurance. It also reiterates a commonplace about the tribal world: their knowledge, stamina and ritual life are astonishing expressions of what humanity can achieve. But there may well be a fatal, developmental destiny that is working towards their extinction.

The 1972 film was criticised for being too focused on a Tuareg community that happened to be struggling at that time in the unforgiving mountains, and not drawing attention to the many Tuareg who lived, farming as well as herding, in more fertile settings across the region. Much more recent footage of the people of the western Sahara came with the ‘Deserts’ episode of the BBC’s Human Planet series – again with the emphasis all on beautiful, exotic, extremes of hardship.

In fact, the region of the Tuareg – who speak a language that links them to the Berber of further north - is very large, reaching into the countries of the western Sahara: Algeria, Mali and Niger, as well as Libya. This wide geographical range is thus parallel to a complex set of social and political circumstances. There are indeed Tuareg families and communities that live a life of mobile pastoralism, moving with their camels and goats across the far depths of the Sahara. But there are also Tuareg living settled lives, within and as part of nation states and national politics. So the link between the fugitive and bellicose Gaddafi and “the Tuareg” leaves open an ambiguity. Tuareg leaders with whom the Gaddafis could have long and deep alliances will not necessarily be the mobile herders of the deep Sahara – though the people he and his cronies deal with as they defend their last holdouts or make their escape are likely to include the Tuareg who live deep in and know best the Sahara where Gaddafi has been thought to be hiding.

Gaddafi’s tent

Gaddafi has enjoyed playing the myth of the pastoralist nomad, insisting on his own fascinating if rather deranged portrayal of his place deep in that tribal stereotype – simple life in a tent, no definable political status in some utopia of equality, and no private wealth. His enjoyment of this myth of himself when hosting leaders from the Europe and America has been evident. Inviting Tony Blair to share his simple tent for meetings to agree that Libya was no longer a rogue state was a fine example of this myth being used to considerable effect. And Gaddafi’s recent, and perhaps last, protestations have played to the myth again: he tells the world that he has no official position, no office of any kind – suggesting again that his is the simple life of the nomad, in his tent, servant of his people, hero of his egalitarian society. In a video clip that the revolutionaries found after occupying the Gaddafi compound cum bunker in Tripoli, we can see Gaddafi in his tent, enjoying family time with a son, daughter-in-law and sweet looking grand-daughter. The way he plays with the child is compelling, though the eye is drawn to the wariness on the face of the child, the watchfulness of Gaddafi’s son and daughter-in-law. Looking beyond the people, though, it is possible to catch glimpses of the electric power points, heaters and other indications that this is not a tent of a nomad in the desert, but a comfortable, modern dwelling. There have long been Mongolian families (also with a heritage of mobile pastoralism) living in fine Yurts just outside Ulan Batur, commuting to their jobs in town, because this provides comfort as well as a sense of identity. In a similar way, Gaddafi has enjoyed a luxury tent of his own, with all modern comforts. In it, he does his best to stoke up the myth of his nomad simplicity – his claim to be on the good, desert side of both the cultural and moral dyads.

The fight for autonomy

So who are the Tuareg with whom Gaddafi may long have been in close and complex political alliance? Like those groups that choose to be known as First Nations in North America, the Tuareg have insisted that they are a people with a distinct history and territory, and therefore a right to their own lands or state. Comprising up to 10% of the populations of the countries where they find themselves, the total Tuareg population in Niger is over one million, and around 900,000 in Mali. Smaller numbers are in Algeria and Burkina Faso, while the Libyan Tuareg population may once have been small but has been increased in recent years by Gaddafi’s policy of opening Libyan borders to Tuareg refugees from other states. This large, diverse set of populations, shares a strong sense of history and, at crucial times in recent decades, of destiny. Fierce Tuareg independent movements, in effect insurrections, were launched in the 1990s in Niger and Mali. These were not the first attempts by Tuareg to achieve autonomy, and to emancipate themselves from an oppressive, subordinate relationship to the nations that took shape in the Sahara. Independence movements of various kinds are spread through the twentieth century and there is evidence of Tuareg conflict with other groups going back to their earliest appearance in the region, some thirteen hundred years ago. These are people well used to doing battle. And some of this battle has involved Libya. In the 1980s, Libyan Tuareg were involved in an armed liberation movement in the 1990s Tuareg, supported by Libya, were involved in civil war in Mali. And of special relevance here: Gaddafi’s regime espoused the cause of Tuareg at least in so far as working to ensure that Tuareg in Mali and Niger were able to reach some kind of negotiated agreement and a temporary peace.

These recurrent, bitter and often violent conflicts have shaped Tuareg modern history. The Tuareg have not succeeded in securing their own nation, or even won security within the existing nations where they have suffered discrimination and dispossession. But they did manage to sustain, and even to strengthen their economic base, especially in the 1980s and 90s, as the Sahara opened to outsiders, launching tourism. By the beginning of the new century, the Tuareg were a tribal group with many national identities, at risk in some areas, suffering the impacts of drought and political oppression, and, in the remoter parts of the Sahara, along the Libyan-Niger border, having a degree of autonomy. And with strong links to the Gaddafi regime – from which support had come in their struggles against the Niger and Mali governments, as well as some direct aid, thanks to Libyan oil money, to towns where Tuareg were living in extremes of poverty.

Then came 9/11

Then came 9/11 and the global war on terror. This was to change life in the Sahara, and is the new, crucial background to the Tuareg-Gaddafi alliance.

Jeremy Keenan, the anthropologist whose work lay behind the 1972 Disappearing World Tuareg film, has been setting out in fascinating deal, on the basis of long and intimate knowledge of the region, the way that the new politics has threatened to engulf and transform Tuareg life. En su libro The Dark Sahara and much other writing and broadcasting, Keenan has described the way Algeria managed to nurture a myth of Al Qaeda and Taliban incursions into the Sahara, encouraging the idea that once established there, Islamic terrorists would be better placed to launch their murderous attacks on Europe. The advantage of this notion to Algeria lay in its leading to a strong military alliance with the USA – getting arms for its own struggle against internal opposition, and drawing the Americans into a militarization of the Sahara. Keenan shows how this resulted in the Tuareg being labeled as key supporters of Al Qaeda, making them enemies of everyone else and ensuring that they would have an even weaker basis for seeking any form of autonomy or redress for the wrongs they had suffered in Algeria, Niger or Mali. And causing a collapse in the tourist economy in the region, on which many if not most Tuareg were dependent.

This double assault meant that Tuareg families and whole communities found themselves impoverished and at the same time under new kinds of attack. Keenan says that there is strong evidence that different kinds of agentes provocadores, initiated and supported by different governments, ensured that the Tuareg were drawn into conflict. Thus lies about the Tuareg could be deemed to be at the heart of the ‘terrorism’ of the Sahara. Thus aid and arms would flow from the USA and its apparently unlimited budgets for the war on terror, to Algeria, Niger, Mali…. the very nations that had for so long done battle against the aspirations and rights of the Tuareg.

This destructive process spiraled into increasing frustration, rage and violence. Between 2004 and 2008, Tuareg were involved in a succession of riots and armed insurrections in Mali and Niger. Keenan has stated that these were in large measure prompted and manipulated by both national governments and US agents. Keenan also insists, on the basis of a lifetime of working with Tuareg and being in the Sahara throughout the crucial period, that the Tuareg have had no organized links to Al Qaeda. Yet the Tuareg were also having to cope with, and of course were protesting against, the way their resources were being alienated or down-graded by the new politics at work in their lands.

Hundreds of Tuareg were killed in this period large numbers of Tuareg animals were destroyed – many by the Niger military. The anti Al-Qaeda measures included great restriction of Tuareg mobility – causing further economic difficulties to families dependent on nomadic pastoralism. The total collapse of tourism alone meant that something like 70 million US dollars went out of the local, especially Tuareg, economies.

Some of the consequences of this new set of assaults on Tuareg life are not hard to imagine. Stigmatized and treated as terrorist allies of Al Qaeda, supporters of imagined Taliban refugees from Afghanistan, implicated in dramatic kidnappings, drawn into putative civil wars, suffering new levels of poverty – there were sure to be some who would take whatever opportunities the new circumstances offered, be it to make money or to express anger. There was also a new level of demand for specialised skills: navigating, driving, finding hiding places – tasks called for by that militarization and new intrusions onto the Sahara, and tasks at which the Tuareg could excel.

Realpolitik

It is not hard to see how the Gaddafi regime might have fitted into all this. The one thing Tripoli could offer was cash, as well as some appealing ideological and political rhetoric. Buying allegiance has always been the basis of the Gaddafi internal politics denouncing the Americans was a core of his public rhetoric. Confusing as it may be that Gaddafi also bought allegiance within Niger and Burkina Faso, he built up a well funded link to Tuareg – offering many kinds of support to a people who were in dire need of friends and cash.

Libya’s involvement in the Tuareg struggles through the 80s and 90s, its shift to a pro-western, anti-Islamacist position after 9/11, the last ditch battle of the past weeks – through all this Gaddafi has been able to look to overlapping interests with the Tuareg. In 2005, Libya offered residency to all Tuareg who were refugees from their wars with Niger and Mali. Thousands of Tuareg relocated to Libya, finding work in the oil and gas sector. A year later, Gaddafi invited the Tuareg to be an important part of an anti-terrorist and anti-drug-smuggling coalition in the Sahara.

This has been a realpolitik on both sides, a drama played out over many acts and a vast terrain. It has also been a matter of simple economic opportunity: as part of his dealings with Tuareg, Gaddafi’s regime offered young men $1,000 per month to join the Libyan army – pay of about twenty times their more normal earnings. It is not surprising that many of those Tuareg Gaddafi has supported in their desperate struggles against the forces of history have come to help their long-term ally and benefactor in his own final scenes. On September 23, a news story appeared covering a warning that the Tuareg had apparently issued to Mali: “if you interfere with Gaddafi we will overthrow your government”. They are also said to have added a declaration, reminding everyone that they are, “the lords of the desert”. Here are the two aspects of the liaison, as it is now represented by the Tuareg.

Bitter ironies

There are ironies and paradoxes to all this, some of them bitter. This is often the case with the circumstances of tribal peoples. Exploited and dispossessed by those with national or imperial powers, coping with all kinds of environmental loss – from industrial development to climate change ­– they have to find alliances where they can. In the tortured misrepresentations and distorted realities of the global war against terror as it has played out in the Sahara, the Tuareg were threatened by renewed efforts on the part of old enemies as well as a whole new kind of enemy. Well used to fighting for their rights, familiar with warfare as well as the secret trails of the Sahara, they could at least look to Gaddafi and his cash as far as they could see, no one else had taken care to protect their rights or listen to their protests against new and brutal attacks on them. No one else had taken any interest in offering them sanctuary or, most important of all, earnings.

Perhaps they have been manipulated by Libya, or deceived into believing that their real interests are close to Gaddafi’s heart. So they fight on the wrong side? For the Tuareg, all sides have no doubt seemed to be indifferent to their losses. They can hardly look to the NATO bombs or the revolutionaries liberating Libya for a new, unprecedented sympathy. For the victims of state violence and international disregard, for peoples who have been exploited and misrepresented to serve the interests of whoever came along, there is sure to be both opportunism and the honouring of the Gaddafis – the ones who have given them some kind of help in the past.

There is a passage at the end of a piece Jeremy Keenan wrote for Al Jazeera in which he gives an overview of the way the Tuareg became caught in the lies and distortions that the new geopolitics caused to spread into the Sahara:

‘Marginalised by their governments ignored by the international community and deprived by the Global War on Terror of their livelihoods, but still skilled fighters, the question now being asked is whether the Tuareg…will attempt to take matters into their own hands’.

This was written before the Gaddafi regime was destroyed, but it speaks to the apparent enigma of the strange and disturbing alliance between him and the Tuareg at the margins of Libya and, now, at the centre of Gaddafi’s chances of coming out alive.

The tribal appears, almost by definition, to be at the very edges of our world - marginal and increasingly irrelevant. Looking closer, however, we again and again find that, in their remarkable way, Tribes reveal what is happening at the centre.

Thus have the Tuareg come to be at the centre of Libyan events, for which many of them may find themselves paying a dreadful price. They have had few friends, and may now have increased the animosity of their old enemies. The Libyans who are taking over their country need to find the fullest and most intelligent understanding of the history that has shaped the lives and decisions of the Tuareg. They must bring the Tuareg a new justice rather than yet another level of retribution.


How is Gaddafi viewed outside the West? - Historia

The savage killing Thursday of deposed Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi served to underscore the criminal character of the war that has been prosecuted by the US and NATO over the past eight months.

The assassination follows NATO’s more than month-long siege of Sirte, the Libyan coastal city that was Gaddafi’s hometown and a center of his support. The assault on this city of 100,000 left virtually every building smashed, with untold numbers of civilians dead, wounded and stricken by disease, as they were deprived of food, water, medical care and other basic necessities.

Gaddafi was apparently traveling in a convoy of vehicles attempting to break out of the siege after the last bastion of resistance had fallen to the NATO-backed “rebels”. NATO warplanes attacked the convoy at 8:30 a.m. Thursday morning, leaving a number of vehicles in flames and preventing it from moving forward. Then the armed anti-Gaddafi militias moved in for the kill.

The death of Gaddafi appears to have been part of a larger massacre that has reportedly claimed the lives of a number of his top aides, loyalist fighters and his two sons, Mo’tassim and Saif al-Islam.

While details of the killings remain somewhat clouded, photographs and cell phone videos released by the NATO-backed “rebels” clearly show a wounded Gaddafi struggling with his captors and shouting as he is dragged onto the back of a vehicle. His stripped and lifeless body is then shown, drenched in blood. It seems clear that having first been wounded, perhaps in the NATO air strikes, the former Libyan ruler was captured alive and then summarily executed. One photograph shows him with a bullet hole in the head.

Gaddafi’s body was then taken west to the city of Misrata, where it was reportedly dragged through the streets before being deposited in a mosque.

The fate of the body is politically significant in that it was seized by a Misrata militia faction that is operating under its own command and has no loyalty to the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC), which Washington and NATO have anointed as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Libyan people.

Thus this grisly event, which President Barack Obama hailed in the White House Rose Garden Thursday as the advent of “a new and democratic Libya,” in reality only exposes the regional and tribal fault lines that are setting the stage for a protracted period of civil war.

Both the US and France claimed credit for their roles in the murder of Gaddafi. The Pentagon asserted on Thursday that a US Predator drone had fired a Hellfire missile at the ousted Libyan leader’s convoy, while France’s defense minister said that French warplanes had bombed it.

The US and NATO had carried out repeated air strikes on Gaddafi’s compounds in Tripoli and other homes where they suspected he was hiding since shortly after the brutal air war against Libya was launched last March. One of these strikes at the end of last April claimed the lives of his youngest son and three young grandchildren.

Washington had deployed surveillance planes along with large numbers of drones in an attempt to track down Gaddafi, while US, British and French intelligence agents, special operations troops and military “contractors” operating on the ground also participated in this manhunt.

After three decades of US-led wars, the outbreak of a third world war, which would be fought with nuclear weapons, is an imminent and concrete danger.

Just two days before the murder of Gaddafi, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton staged an unannounced visit to Tripoli on a heavily armed military aircraft. While there, she issued a demand that Gaddafi be brought in “dead or alive”.

As the Associated Press reported, Clinton declared “in unusually blunt terms that the United States would like to see former dictator Muammar Gaddafi dead.

“‘We hope he can be captured or killed soon so that you don’t have to fear him any longer’, Clinton told students and others at a town hall-style gathering in the capital city.”

The AP went on to note: “Until now, the US has generally avoided saying that Gaddafi should be killed.”

Yet in reality, Washington is pursuing an unconcealed policy of state murder. In this case, it has openly advocated and provided every resource to facilitate the killing of a head of state with whom the US government had established close political and commercial relations over the course of the last eight years.

The battered corpse of Gaddafi’s son Mo’tassim, who was also captured alive and then executed, was put on display in Misrata. As recently as April 2009 he was warmly welcomed to the US State Department by Hillary Clinton.

In his Rose Garden speech Thursday, Obama boasted of his administration having “taken out” Al Qaeda leaders, sounding for all the world like a Mafia don, minus the charm. Among his most recent victims are two US citizens, Anwar Awlaki, the Arizona-born Yemeni-American Muslim cleric, last month and, two weeks later, his 16-year-old son Abdulrahman, who was born in Denver. Both had been placed on a “kill list” by a secret National Security Council subcommittee and murdered with Hellfire missiles. Abdulrahman was blown to bits along with his 17-year-old cousin and seven other friends as they ate dinner.

The killing of Gaddafi is the culmination of a criminal war that killed untold numbers of Libyans and left most of the country in ruins. This operation was launched on the pretext of protecting civilian lives, based on the trumped up claim that Gaddafi was preparing to lay siege to the eastern city of Benghazi to massacre his opponents. It has ended with NATO orchestrating a siege of Sirte, where thousands have been killed and wounded in suppressing opposition to the “rebels”.

From the beginning, the entire operation has been directed at the re-colonization of North Africa and pursued on behalf of US, British, French, Italian and Dutch oil interests.

While over the past decade Gaddafi had curried favor with US, Britain, France and other Western powers, striking oil deals, arms agreements and other pacts, US imperialism and its counterparts in Europe continued to see his regime as an impediment to their aims in the region.

Among the principal concerns in Washington, London and Paris were the increasing Chinese and Russian economic interests in Libya and more generally Africa as a whole. China had developed $6.6 billion in bilateral trade, mainly in oil, while some 30,000 Chinese workers were employed in a wide range of infrastructure projects. Russia, meanwhile, had developed extensive oil deals, billions of dollars in arms sales and a $3 billion project to link Sirte and Benghazi by rail. There were also discussions on providing the Russian navy with a Mediterranean port near Benghazi.

Gaddafi had provoked the ire of the government of Nicolas Sarkozy in France with his hostility to its scheme for creating a Mediterranean Union, aimed at refurbishing French influence in the country’s former colonies and beyond.

Moreover, major US and Western European energy conglomerates increasingly chafed at what they saw as tough contract terms demanded by the Gaddafi government, as well as the threat that the Russian oil company Gazprom would be given a big stake in the exploitation of the country’s reserves.

Combined with these economic and geo-strategic motives were political factors. The turn by Gaddafi toward closer relations to the West had allowed Washington and Paris to cultivate elements within his regime who were prepared to collaborate in an imperialist takeover of the country. This includes figures like Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Gaddafi’s former Justice Minister and now chairman of the NATO-backed NTC and Mahmoud Jibril, the former economics official who is chief of the NTC cabinet.

With the popular upheavals in Tunisia and Egypt—on Libya’s western and eastern borders—the US and its NATO allies saw an opportunity to put into operation a plan that had been developed over some time for regime change in Libya. With agents on the ground, they moved to exploit and hijack anti-Gaddafi demonstrations and foment an armed conflict.

To prepare for a direct imperialist takeover, they followed a well-worn path, vilifying the country’s leader and promoting the idea that only outside intervention could save innocent civilians from a looming massacre.

The supposed imminent destruction of Benghazi was utilized to win support for imperialist war from a whole range of ex-lefts, liberals, academics and human rights advocates, who lent their moral and intellectual weight to an exercise in imperialist aggression and murder.

Figures like University of Michigan Middle Eastern history professor Juan Cole, who had raised limited criticism of the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq, became enthusiastic promoters of the “humanitarian” mission of the Pentagon and NATO in Libya. Representative of an upper middle class social layer that has become a new constituency for imperialism, they were utterly compromised, politically and morally. They were untroubled by the lawlessness of the entire enterprise and the mounting evidence of the murder and torture of immigrants and black Libyans by the so-called rebels.

Their attempt to portray the regime change in Libya as a popular revolution becomes more preposterous with each passing day. The unstable puppet regime that is taking shape in Benghazi and Tripoli has been installed through relentless and massive NATO bombing, murder and the wholesale violation of international law.

Libya stands as a warning to the world. Any regime that gets in the way of US interests, runs afoul of the major corporations or fails to do the bidding of the NATO powers can be overthrown by military force, with its leaders murdered.

Already, the US media, which has staged a hideous celebration of the bloodbath outside Sirte, is braying for NATO to repeat its Libyan intervention in Syria. For her part, Clinton warned Pakistani leaders on Thursday that insufficient support for the US-war in Afghanistan would mean that they would pay “a very big price.”

There can be no doubt that future operations are on the way, with bigger wars coming into focus, posing catastrophic consequences. The Obama administration has already put Iran on notice that all options remain “on the table” in relation to a fabricated plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. And as the Libyan intervention was aimed in no small part at countering Chinese and Russian influence both in the region and globally, so China and Russia themselves are seen as future targets.

The bloody events in Libya, and the economic motives underlying them, are providing a fresh lesson in the real character of imperialism. The crisis gripping world capitalism is once again posing the threat of world war. The working class can confront this threat only by mobilizing its independent political strength and rearming itself with the program of world socialist revolution to put an end to the profit system, which is the source of militarism.


Ver el vídeo: La Verdad. Intereses de occidente. avi (Diciembre 2021).